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Credit unions are an
important financial
intermediary with a long
history. The first U.S. credit
union was established in
1909.1 Today, there are
more than 7,500 U.S. credit
unions with total assets
approaching $1 trillion,2
and more than 90 million
Americans are members of
credit unions representing a
penetration rate of 44
percent.3 Nevertheless,
despite their important role
in the financial sector,
credit unions have not
received a great deal of
attention in the academic
literature. 
The economic performance
of credit unions is
understudied for two
reasons. First, credit unions
are non-profit institutions,
and so their performance is
not encapsulated in
summary measures such as
net profit and stock price.
Instead, their performance
must be assessed by
simultaneously considering
an array of inputs (e.g.,
operating expenses) and
outputs (e.g., loans), which
pose methodological
challenges. Second, credit
unions have unique
characteristics that make
comparisons with other
depository institutions such
as commercial banks
difficult. For example, banks
are subject to taxation while
credit unions are not, and
banks are permitted to offer
a much wider array of
products and services than
credit unions. Nevertheless,
a niche literature has
evolved in which a variety of
parametric and non-
parametric approaches are
used to assess the impact of
industry characteristics on
relative credit union
performance both
cross-sectionally and across
time. This study contributes
to this literature by
assessing the impact of
credit union expansion on
the relative efficiency of
university credit unions. 
In an early study of
credit union efficiency using
data from 1990, Fried,
Lovell, and Turner (1996)
found that university credit
unions were more efficient
than other types of credit
unions. In the ensuing
twenty years, the financial
markets have changed
substantially, and the
financial services industry
has become more
competitive. This study
argues, as do others (e.g.,
Mohanty, 2006) that credit
unions compete with banks
and other financial
institutions. Indeed, this
perspective is supported by
the extensive and
continuing lobbying efforts
by banks against the
tax-free status of credit
unions. In this competitive
environment, both
regulatory and legislative
changes have permitted
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credit unions to expand the
scope and geographic reach
of their memberships. In
particular, the Credit Union
Membership Access Act of
1998 (hereafter, CUMA)
allowed credit unions to
expand by serving multiple
bond groups. Now, credit
unions are fewer, but they
are larger on average, and
many have a more
diversified membership
base. It is an empirical
question whether, in this
changed environment, credit
unions serving universities
still outperform those with
other membership
associations. 
Fried, Lovell, and Turner
(1996) argue that university
credit unions perform better
because their members are
highly educated. A more
general argument is that
focused, or single-bond,
credit unions face an
economic tradeoff. On the
one hand, the homogeneity
of members may serve to
constrain agency costs, and
managerial opportunism
can be curtailed; we refer to
this as the benefits of
specialization. On the other
hand, a limited membership
may constrain the ability of
university credit unions to
diversify and control risk
and achieve economies of
scale and scope. As the
overall industry moves
toward greater size, other
non-university credit unions
may be achieving
diversification and scale/
scope benefits that more
focused university credit
unions are not.4 This
study’s tests allow
researchers to determine
the impact of expansion—
and the related effects of
diversification and scope—
on the relative performance
of university credit unions.
Overall, the study
determined that university
credit unions outperform
non-university credit unions
despite the changed
landscape for financial
institutions. Thus, at least
in this setting and for these
institutions, benefits of
specialization continue to be
important, even though sig-
nificant benefits of scale
were found as well. 
The current study also
contributes in other ways.
Credit union expansion has
resulted in three different
types of credit unions that
cater to universities: those
that restrict membership to
university communities
(university only credit
unions), those that started
as university credit unions
but later expanded to the
broader community
(diversified from university
credit unions), and those
that were not formed as a
university credit union but
are now affiliated with a
university and include
university members
(diversified to university
credit unions). The unique,
hand-collected data allow us
this distinction to be made
for the first time in this
literature and allow more
nuanced inferences to be
made concerning university
credit union performance in
two ways: we are able to test
whether (a) university only
credit unions outperform
the university but
diversified credit unions and
(b) university origin leads to
better performance among
diversified credit unions.
The former test examines
the benefits of a university
focus and the latter
examines the benefits of
university origin. 
Research on the impact
of growth on credit union
efficiency has conflicting
results. Studies of credit
union mergers show either
no change in the efficiency
of merging firms (Garden
and Ralston, 1999) or find
that the efficiency/
performance of acquiring
firms does not change after
a merger but that the
efficiency/performance of
the acquired credit union
does improve (Fried, Lovell,
& Yaisawarng, 1999 and
Bauer, Miles, & Nishikawa,
2009). In more general
studies that compare the
relative efficiency or
performance of single bond
credit unions with multiple
bond credit unions, some
find single bond credit
unions outperform multiple
bond credit unions (Frame,
Karels & McClatchey, 2003;
Legget & Strand, 2002),
while others find that
multiple bond credit unions
outperform single bond
credit unions (Glass &
McKillop, 2006). Two types
of tests—one comparing
university with
non-university credit unions
and the other comparing
various types of university
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credit unions—add to this
literature. Overall, our
evidence is consistent with
both (a) benefits of
university origin and (b)
benefits of scale. 
Credit union
membership has increased
in the wake of the 2010 Wall
Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).
Commercial banks have
increased fees and added
restrictions to free checking
accounts to offset lost
revenues that result from
the recent regulatory
changes.5 In light of these
new fees, credit unions are
gaining more attention as
an attractive, low cost
alternative to commercial
banks. 
Since many credit
unions have expanded and
diversified following the
passage of CUMA,
consumers are now eligible
for membership in a wide
range of different credit
unions; the results of this
study suggest a number of
factors for consumers to
consider when selecting
from the different options.
While it is worth noting that
these results are not
necessarily generalizable,
this study suggests that
consumers consider credit
union affiliation, credit
union size and credit union
origin when deciding which
credit union to join.  
Background and
Hypothesis
Federal credit unions
are chartered under the
Federal Credit Union Act of
1934 (hereafter, FCUA). The
interpretation of Section
109 of FCUA, which
restricts credit union
membership to “individuals
sharing a common bond of
occupation, association, or
geographic area,” has been
a contentious issue for the
industry. In 1982, the
National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA)6
loosened its interpretation
of this requirement and
allowed credit unions to add
additional groups to their
membership pool.
Presumably, this relaxation
of membership rules was
initiated as a response to
several credit union failures
and the need for credit
unions to diversify their
asset base. But this was a
controversial move.
Predictably, commercial
banks objected and filed a
court challenge. The
uncertainty over adding
multiple groups was finally
resolved in 1998 with the
passage of CUMA, which
expressly allowed credit
union expansion to serve
multiple bond groups.
Developments in the 2000s
have weakened the common
bond restriction even more
and allowed further
expansion by credit unions.7
Although CUMA and
credit unions’ expansion
with the addition of multiple
groups has been a primary
focus of credit union
research, two other
developments have a
bearing on our study. First,
deregulation in the banking
sector has allowed banks to
expand across state lines
and offer an expanded array
of products.8 Second,
technological advances over
the past twenty years have
expanded the number and
type of service offerings of
all financial institutions.
Both these developments
are consistent with
depositary institutions
getting larger. In this new
setting, there is a potential
weakening of the value
proposition offered by
focused university credit
unions.
Prior studies of credit
union performance focus on
detecting differences across
credit union types and
evaluating the impact of
expansion or mergers.
Examples of the former are
Fried, Lovell and Eeckaut
(1993), Fried, Lovell, and
Turner (1996), Fukuyama,
Guerra and Weber (1999),
Frame, Karels, and
McCatchey (2003) and Glass
and McKillop (2006).
Examples of the latter are
Leggett and Strand (2002),
Fried, Lovell, and
Yaisawarng (1999), Garden,
and Ralston (1999), and
Bauer, Miles, and Nishikawa
(2009). This study adds to
this literature by examining
how credit union expansion
has affected the
performance of university
credit unions.
The study derives three
hypotheses. The first
hypothesis concerns the
efficiency of university credit
unions relative to that of
non-university credit unions
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and is referred to as the
“efficiency” hypothesis. The
second hypothesis, the
“university focus”
hypothesis, concerns
differences between
university credit unions that
cater solely to the university
community and university
credit unions that also serve
a wider community. A
corollary to the university
focus hypothesis is the
“university origin
hypothesis,” which concerns
differences between
diversified university credit
unions that started as
university only credit
unions and diversified
university credit unions that
started as non-university
credit unions. The third
hypothesis concerns
differences in agency costs
for the different types of
university affiliated credit
unions, which is referred to
as the “agency costs”
hypothesis. These three
hypotheses are further
explained below.
The efficiency
hypothesis posits that
measures of efficiency are
greater for university credit
unions than those of
non-university credit
unions. This hypothesis was
developed and tested in
Fried, Lovell, and Turner
(1996), but this study’s
contribution lies in
replicating the earlier test
by using an updated
sample. The motivation for
using an updated sample is
straight-forward. Many
significant changes have
occurred in the environment
for credit unions as well as
for competing financial
institutions. Principally,
most credit unions have
grown larger and
increasingly compete with
banks; university credit
unions may have also grown
to keep up with other
institutions. It is an open
question whether this
re-shuffled financial
landscape maintains,
enhances or degrades the
relative efficiency of
university credit unions. It
therefore is an empirical
matter to ascertain whether
the superiority of university
credit unions detected by
Fried et al. has changed in
recent times.
The university focus and
university origin hypotheses
relate to differences between
subcategories of university
credit unions. Because of
the move in the 1980s and
1990s toward increasing
member groups and the
number of members, a
number of credit unions
serving universities have
expanded to serve other
groups. Some have
expanded out of universities
to serve other select
employer groups or an
entire community
(diversified from university),
while others have expanded
their field of membership to
include universities
(diversified to university).
These “university plus”
credit unions tend to be
larger than university only
credit unions. Our sample
contains university only and
university plus credit
unions and allows us to test
the university focus
hypothesis which states that
university only credit unions
are more efficient than
university plus credit
unions. The university focus
hypothesis directly flows
from the arguments offered
by Fried, Lovell, and Turner
(1996) which argued that
the educated members of
university credit unions
contribute efficiency. A
corollary to the university
focus hypothesis is the
university origin hypothesis,
which states that, among
university credit unions that
are diversified, those that
originated as university only
credit unions are more
efficient that those that
started as non-university
credit unions.
The third hypothesis
shifts focus to agency costs.
The researchers tested
whether expansion to more
heterogeneous membership
increases agency costs. An
earlier study (Leggett and
Strand, 2002) argues that
multiple group credit unions
face a higher level of agency
costs and that these
increased costs are evident
in the following metrics: (a)
the spread between deposit
and lending rates (net
interest margin) (b) the ratio
of operating expenses to
assets and (c) the ratio of
salaries and benefits to
assets. Credit union
expansion would appear to
be motivated by agency
problems if larger, more
diversified operations have
higher operating expenses
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and sales relative to assets
and offer less favorable
interest rates. The primary
test is whether university
only credit unions have
lower agency costs than
diversified university credit
unions. A secondary test is
whether diversified
university origin credit
unions (diversified from
university category) have
lower agency costs than
other diversified university
credit unions (diversified to
university category).
Sample and Summary
Statistics
Sample
The sample was
collected in three steps.
First, the overall sample of
credit unions was collected.
This initial data set is
comprised of all active credit
unions reporting end of year
data for 2008 to the NCUA,
including 4,851 with federal
charters and 3,117 with
state charters; it was
obtained from Form 5300
data downloaded from the
NCUA website. From the
initial data set of 7,968
records, 363 records were
removed for incomplete or
significantly atypical values.
More specifically, records
were removed from the data
set for one or more of the
following reasons: operating
expenses were zero, no
loans were listed, no loan
interest was listed, average
deposits were greater than
$25,000, the dividend rate
on regular shares was
greater than 10 percent, no
full time or part time
employees were listed, and
employee salary was listed
as zero. This resulted in a
final data set of 7,615
records. 
Next, the researchers
determined whether a credit
union in the sample was
serving a university
community in 2008. This
was achieved using the
following manual procedure.
A listing of all U.S. colleges
and universities was
obtained from Peterson’s
college search website in
2008. For each U.S.
four-year college or
university, an internet
search established whether
the institution offered credit
unions services to their
employees or students.
From the initial list of 2,174
four-year, U.S. universities
and colleges listed, 159 were
found to have an affiliated
credit union and 156 of
those were in the main
credit union sample.9
As a third and final step, 
university credit union
subcategories were
established. Using
information gathered from
the university and credit
union websites,10 each
credit union was placed in
one of three categories: 1)
university only: credit
unions serving only the
university community (i.e.,
membership was limited to
some or all of the following
constituents: faculty, staff,
students, alumni and
affiliated organizations
operating on campus such
as military personal and
independent contractors), 2)
diversified from university:
credit unions that were
founded to serve the
university community but
which have subsequently
expanded their membership
base into the broader
community, either by
opening up membership to
numerous elect employer
groups or to the local
geographic community at
large, and 3) diversified to
university: non-university
credit unions listed as an
affiliated credit union by the
university. 
Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides a
breakdown of credit union
type by asset size. Overall,
the sample contains 7,615
credit unions, of which 156
(2 percent) are classified as
university affiliated credit
unions. Panel A shows the
distribution of university
and non-university credit
unions in various asset size
categories.11 Most credit
unions, regardless of
whether they are university
credit unions or
non-university credit
unions, fall into the $10
million to $50 million
category. There are 2,482
non-university and 55
university credit unions in
this category; however, for
non-university credit unions
the second most common
asset category is $2 million
to less than $10 million
while for university credit
unions it is $100 million to
$500 million. Therefore, it
appears that the average  
6 Winter 2012 Southern Business Review
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university credit union is
larger than the average
non-university credit union.
Within the university
subcategories, university
only credit unions are much
smaller than diversified
from university and
diversified to university
credit unions. Table 1 Panel
B indicates that university
only credit unions are
predominantly in the $10
million to less than $50
million categories while the
diversified from university
credit unions are predom-
inantly in the $100 million
to less than $500 million
category. The diversified to
university credit unions are
spread more evenly in all
size classes with assets
greater than $10 million. We
also note that the diversified
to university is the largest
subcategory containing 69
out of 156 credit unions.
Therefore, it has the
potential to determine the
overall characteristics of the
university category. 
Table 2 provides means
and medians for our key
test variables. Values are
provided separately for
university and non-
university credit unions
(Panels A and C), as well as
for the subcategories of
university credit unions
(Panel B and D). Panels A
and B provide values for the
variables used in the mixed
integer programming
technique, Free Disposal
Hull (FDH) analysis.12
analysis. These variables are
influenced by scale: since
university credit unions are
larger than non-university
credit unions, they have
higher levels of operating
expenses ($10.6 million
versus $3.6 million),
number of loans (18,001
versus 5,725) and number
of deposits (64,800 versus
20,740). University credit
unions pay rates on their
deposits comparable to
non-university credit unions
(2.0% versus 2.1%) but they
charge lower average rates
on their loans (6.8% versus
7.5%). Finally, university
credit unions, perhaps
because they are larger or
perhaps because they are
catering to more educated
members, offer a larger
variety of loans, deposit
accounts and internet
services.
The variations across
university affiliated credit
unions (Panel B) are
significant. The university
only credit unions are
substantially smaller than
the diversified from and the
diversified to university
credit unions as reflected in
their average respective
operating expenses ($2.0
million, $11.9 million and
$16.6 million), number of
loans (3,492, 22,803, and
27,060) and number of
deposits (13,171, 73,375,
and 101,582). Diversified
from credit unions charge
lower loan rates on average
than the other two sub-
groups, at 6.4 percent
compared to 6.9 percent for
university only credit unions
and 6.8 percent for
diversified to credit unions.
They also offer higher
average rates on their
deposits: 2.2 percent
compared to 1.8 percent for
university only credit unions
and 2.1 percent for
diversified to university
credit unions. Despite their
smaller size relative to
diversified to university
credit unions, diversified
from university credit
unions offer a comparable
variety of loans, deposit
accounts and internet
service, while both these
categories offer a wider
array of services than the
smaller university only
credit unions. 
Table 2 Panels C and D
provide additional compari-
sons between university and
non-university credit unions
as well as a comparison
between the subcategories
of university credit unions.
Some of the listed variables
are used in testing the
agency cost hypothesis
while others are used to
further explain differences
in efficiency or risk between
the different types of credit
union. In Panel C, the first
two variables (members and
assets) confirm that
university affiliated credit
unions are larger than
non-university credit
unions. In addition, univer-
sity credit unions operate
with a lower capital base
(with a net worth ratio of
11.9 percent compared to
14.9%), have a higher loan
to deposit ratio (75.4%
versus 71.6%) and make
fewer investments relative to
loans (54% versus 71.9%),
making them less liquid,
8 Winter 2012 Southern Business Review
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but they generate a higher
ROA12 (0.20% versus 0%).
Furthermore, university
credit unions have a lower
net interest margin (4.7%
versus 5.4%) and a lower
bad debt ratio (1.4% versus
2.2%), perhaps indicating
lower risk in lending.
Finally, operating expenses
and salaries and benefits
relative to assets are similar
for university and
non-university credit
unions. 
Prior literature shows
that university credit unions
are more efficient than
non-university credit
unions. Fried, Lovell, and
Turner (1996) argue that
the highly educated
members of a university
credit union are the cause
of its higher performance.
The univariate tests
reported above help us
unearth other more subtle
reasons behind the superior
performance of university
credit unions. It is quite
possible that university
credit unions serve a stable
roster of members and that
they take lower risks. The
lower interest margin and,
more importantly, the lower
loan rates indicate a lower
risk level, which is
confirmed by the lower bad
debt ratio. 
Further distinctions
across the different types of
university affiliated credit
union are provided in Panel
D. Diversified to university
credit unions are the largest
on average, followed in order
by diversified from
university credit unions and
university only credit
unions, with respective
average membership counts
and average assets of
53,572, 35,989, 7,741 and
$468,418, $319,189 and
$66,571. Nevertheless, it is
the diversified from
university credit unions that
maintain the lowest capital
base (10.6% compared to
11.9% for diversified to
university credit unions and
12.7% for university only
credit unions); the lowest
spreads—meaning that they
offer more favorable rates to
their members (4.2%
compared to 4.6% for
diversified to university
credit unions and 5.1% for
university only credit
unions); experience the
lowest bad debt ratio (0.9%
compared to 1.4% for
diversified to university
credit unions and 1.7% for
university only credit
unions); and maintain the
lowest operating expenses
and salaries to assets (4.1%
and 1.9% compared to 4.6%
and 2.2% for diversified to
university credit unions and
4.4% and 2.0% for
university only credit
unions). The diversified from
university credit unions’
ROA lies between those of
the other two categories;
however, since credit unions
are non-profit organizations,
this is not a particularly
meaningful measure of
performance.  
Methodology
The first two hypotheses
concern the efficiency of
university credit unions
relative to non-university
credit unions and
differences between
subcategories of university
credit unions. One way to
assess credit union
efficiency is to measure the
quality and quantity of
services relative to cost of
providing those services. We
use the mixed integer
programming technique,
Free Disposal Hull (FDH),
for this analysis.13 FDH
determines whether one
entity can achieve the same
or better outputs for equal
or fewer inputs than other
entities in the sample. 
In this study, the single
input is the credit union’s
total operating expenses,
while the outputs measure
the competitiveness of its
interest rates, the total
number of its loan and
deposit accounts, and the
variety of products and
services it offers. More
specifically, the outputs in
our FDH model are the
average rate paid on
deposits (measured by the
total dividends on shares
plus interest on deposits
divided by total shares and
deposits), the loan price
(equal to the inverse of the
average rate paid on loans,
measured by interest on
loans minus interest
refunded divided by total
loans and leases),14 the
number of loans
outstanding, the number of
deposit accounts serviced,
and the variety of loans,
deposit accounts and online
services offered. In other
words, we use FDH to
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determine which credit
unions offer more
competitive loan and deposit
rates, achieve the same or
higher utilization of
products and services, and
offer a greater variety of
services for the same or
lower operating costs.
Next we use regression
analysis to test the agency
hypothesis. Following
Leggett and Strand (2002),
we use the following
independent variables in the
regression specification: net
interest margin, operating
costs relative to assets and
salaries, and benefits
relative to assets. A higher
level of agency costs would
be reflected in higher values
of all three variables. We
use assets, loans/deposit,
net worth ratio, bad debt
ratio, number of members
and sponsorship (that is, if
rent expense is zero) as
controls. 
Our key test variables
are the following two
contrast dummy variables.15
The first, university focus
dummy, captures
differences between
university only credit
unions and credit unions
that serve a more diversified
population (diversified from
university credit unions and
diversified to university
credit unions). Our agency
cost hypothesis implies a
negative coefficient
(diversified credit unions
face a higher agency
problem). The second,
university origin dummy,
captures differences
between diversified
university credit unions that
originated on a university
campus and those that did
not.16 Our agency cost
hypothesis implies a
negative coefficient (credit
unions originating from a
university face a lower
agency problem).
Results
As noted in the prior
section, FDH provides a way
to assess the relative
efficiency of credit unions
through an efficiency score.
We evaluate our efficiency
hypothesis and university
focus hypothesis based on
efficiency scores generated
with Efficiency
Measurement System (EMS)
software.17 The efficiency
score can be interpreted in
the following way: an
efficiency score of x % for a
credit union means that it
could provide (1 – x %) more
outputs for the inputs it
uses. Thus, a higher score is
desirable. Table 3 Panel A
provides efficiency scores for
university and
non-university credit
unions. Overall, the
efficiency scores for
university credit unions 
(87%) are higher than those
for non-university credit
unions (83%).18 The
university credit unions also
have a higher efficiency
score than non-university
credit unions in five of six
asset size categories, and
the scores are the same in
the remaining category. This
is a strong indication that
university credit unions
perform better than
non-university credit
unions, and so these results
are consistent with the
efficiency hypothesis. These
efficiency scores for
university and
non-university credit unions
results are lower, but their
relative values are
comparable to those of
Fried, Lovell, and Turner
(1996) who found efficiency
scores of 94.2 percent for
university credit unions and
91.4 percent for
non-university credit
unions.
Table 3 Panel B
compares the efficiency of
the three subcategories of
university credit unions.
Overall, the university only
and diversified from
university categories are
more efficient than
diversified to university; this
is despite the greater size of
the diversified to university
credit unions. These results
are consistent with the
university origin hypothesis.
In four of six asset size
categories, the university
only category has the
highest efficiency score; in
one of the remaining
categories no comparisons
are possible because of
missing observations and in
the other the diversified
from university category has
the highest efficiency score.
Arguably, the diversified
from university category is
more similar to the
university only category
than the diversified to
university category is to the
university only category. 
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Overall, these results
indicate that credit unions
that were formed to serve a
university community are
more efficient than those
that were not. 
We use regression
analysis to explore the
agency costs hypothesis.
The regression results in
Table 4 capture differences
in the net interest margin,
operating expenses relative
to assets and salaries and
benefits relative to assets for
the different types of
university credit union. All
three regressions appear to
be well specified and to have
moderately high R-squared
values. Comparing our
results with Leggett and
Strand (2002), we find that
all R-squared values are
higher, especially the
R-squared for the
regressions involving
operating expenses and
salaries and benefits. 
The key test variables in the
regressions reported in
Table 4 are the university
focus and the university
origin dummies. These
variables reflect the two
components of our agency
cost hypothesis. We find
that the university focus
dummy has a significantly
positive coefficient in the net
interest margin regression
and insignificant coefficients
in the other two regressions.
This result does not support
the first component of the
agency cost hypothesis.
Instead, it indicates that
expansion has resulted in
more favorable interest rates
for members (in the form of
smaller interest margins)
rather than an increase in
managerial perks (which
would be reflected in
operating costs) or higher
salaries and benefits.
Turning to the university
origin dummy, we report
that it has a significantly
negative coefficient in the
salaries and benefits
regression and insignificant
coefficients in the other two 
 
Table 4
Spread, Expense, and Salary Regressions
This table provides OLS regressions of net interest margin, operating expenses/assets and salaries and expenses and assets for
the subset of university credit unions. The regressions are designed to capture differences in spreads and costs between the three
different university credit union subcategories. The first of the two contract dummies, university focus dummy reveals differences
between the university only credit unions and the more diversified university credits, while the university origin dummy reveals
differences between the more diversified credit unions based on their origin (i.e., whether or not they were originally formed at
the university). The variable sponsorship is included to control for credit sponsorship; it takes a value of 1 if a credit union if rent
expense equals zero and a value of 0 otherwise).
 Net interest margin  Operating expenses/assets  Salaries & benefits/assets
 Coef. t statistics P value  Coef. t statistics P value  Coef. t statistics P value
Assets ($billions) -0.0133 -2.02 0.045  -0.0299 -2.95 0.004  -0.0126 -3.28 0.001
Loan/deposit -0.0144 -3.11 0.002  0.0261 3.64 0.000  0.0128 4.71 0.000
Net worth ratio 0.0536 2.90 0.004  -0.0683 -2.22 0.028  -0.0086 -0.74 0.458
Bad debt ratio 0.2672 5.31 0.000  0.1766 2.26 0.025  0.0403 1.37 0.172
# of members (in 1,000s) 0.0001 1.49 0.139  0.0002 2.29 0.023  0.0001 2.47 0.015
Sponsorship -0.0079 -2.36 0.020  -0.0134 -2.60 0.010  -0.0020 -1.04 0.301
University focus dummy 0.0034 2.56 0.012  0.0030 1.45 0.150  -0.0002 -0.32 0.749
University origin dummy -0.0012 -1.14 0.257  -0.0026 -1.53 0.129  -0.0014 -2.22 0.028
Intercept 0.0480 10.14 0.000  0.0321 4.38 0.000  0.0118 4.28 0.000
            
Adjusted R square 34.24%   23.01%   25.58%  
F statistics 11.09   6.79   7.66  
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regressions. This result
provides weak support for
the second component of
the agency cost hypothesis.
Specifically, it indicates that
cost controls may be better
in credit unions that
originated at a university
than those that did not.
Overall, we find that
expansion has provided
benefits especially when it
occurred from university
origin.
Conclusion
In this article, we study
credit union efficiency with
an emphasis on comparing
the performance of
university credit unions
with that of non-university
credit unions. A previous
study making this
comparison uses data from
1990. Since that time, the
institutional landscape has
changed substantially.
Significantly, following
CUMA of 1998, credit
unions have morphed into
larger entities that more
often than not serve
multiple segments. Their
competitors have also
changed: in particular,
banks have been allowed to
expand their operations
across the country, and
deregulation removed the
barriers between
commercial banks,
investment banks and
insurance companies. In
light of these developments,
we test whether the
previously found efficiency
of university credit unions is
preserved. We find that even
though many credit unions
affiliated with universities
have either expanded from
university only membership
to offer services to a more
diversified membership base
or are credit unions that
were not founded on a
university campus but
which now offer
membership to a university
community, these university
credit unions are more still
more efficient, on average,
that non-university credit
unions.
Our study also
contributes by offering a
more nuanced look at
university credit unions. By
using an extensive
hand-collected data set, we
are able to categorize the
university credit unions into
three types: those that start
as a university credit union
and stay that way, those
that start as a university
credit union and later
expand out, and those that
start as a non-university
credit union and later
expand to include university
communities. Our tests
indicate that overall the
second category
outperforms the other two.
Thus, the evidence suggests
that benefits of scale and
especially university origin
are important for university
credit unions. 
As credit unions have
expanded and diversified,
individuals considering
credit union membership
now have a lot more choice
than they did in the past.
Many credit unions that
were initially formed to
serve a single employer or
association have evolved to
offer services to a larger
group of employers or to a
larger segment of the
community. This means
that while individuals used
to have limited choice of
credit union membership, it
is now common for them to
have a wide range of
options. In this study, we
evaluate not only the impact
of economies of scale on the
efficiency level of credit
unions, but also the impact
of membership origin. Our
results suggest that
individuals seeking to join a
credit union should
consider both factors when
deciding which credit union
to join.
Endnotes
1. See Mohanty (2006) for a
brief history of credit unions
and a discussion of the
institutional framework.
2. See http://advice.cuna
.org/download/uscu_
profile_yearend09.pdf for
summary data from the
2005-2009 period.
3. See http://www.woccu
.org/publications/stat
report for the 2009
Statistical Report of the
World Council of Credit
Unions. The penetration
rate is determined by
dividing the total credit
union membership by the
total working age population
(age 16-65).
4. Frame, Karels and
McClatchey (2002) find that
membership expansion has
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the beneficial effect of
reducing concentration risk.
5. For example, as of July 1
2010, banks cannot
authorize ATM and debit
transactions that will result
in an overdraft unless they
have prior approval from the
consumer. Such restrictions
have caused a substantial
drop in overdraft revenue
for commercial banks. 
6. Nationally insured credit
unions are regulated by the
NCUA (which was formed in
1970), and federal credit
union charters are approved
by this agency.
7. A ruling by the NCUA in
2003 broadened the
community charter to
include any single county,
city or political subdivision
regardless of population.
Later, in 2004, the NCUA
approved the charter for a
community credit union in
Los Angeles with a potential
membership of almost 10
million.
8. For a list of key banking
regulations see: http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/la
ws/important/index.html.
9. The other three credit
unions had been removed
from the main credit union
sample because of
incomplete data.
10. All university credit
union websites specify
membership criteria and
most provide a brief history
of the credit union. When
membership was limited to
all or a subset of university
faculty, staff, students and
university affiliated entities
operating on the campus,
such as food service
operations, the credit union
was classified as university
only. When the credit union
membership was listed as
more diversified, and the
history noted that the credit
union was founded on the
university campus, the
credit union was classified
as a diversified from credit
union. When the credit
union membership was
listed as more diversified
and the history noted that
the credit union was not
founded on the university
campus, the credit union
was classified as diversified
to university. When no
history was provided, the
credit union was classified
as diversified to university.
11. We use the size
categories employed by the
NCUA.
12. ROA is measured by Net
Income/Total Assets.
13. FDH is a generalization
of DEA analysis, which was
developed by Charnes,
Cooper and Rhodes (1978)
to assess the performance of
non-profit entities offering
services that are valuable,
but not necessarily priced.
This general class of
analysis is therefore useful
for assessing the efficiency
of entities within the
government sector as well
as non-profit organizations
such as credit unions. Fried
et al (1996) argue that FDH
is preferable to DEA
analysis for measuring the
effectiveness of credit
unions since it removes the
convexity assumption. The
impact of this modification
to the model is that each
entity is assessed relative to
inputs and outputs that
have actually been achieved
rather than combinations of
best practice inputs and
outputs that have not.
14. For FDH analysis a
higher value output is better
than a lower value output;
therefore the loan rate
variable must be modified to
reflect this feature of the
model.
15. Contrast dummy
variables permit tests for
differences between
combined subgroups as well
as for differences across the
different subgroups within
the combined subgroup. For
each contrast dummy
variable, subcategories
coded with a positive
number are compared to
subcategories coded with a
negative number, while
subcategories coded as zero
are left out of the
comparison. Coding is
weighted to ensure the
codes used by each of the
subgroups for a given
dummy sum to zero, and
coding is constructed to
make the contrast dummy
variables orthogonal.
16. In this study, the
university focus dummy is
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coded as 1for university
only credit unions and –0.5
for each of the diversified
credit unions ensuring the
subcategory codes sum to
zero, i.e., 1 – 0.5 – 0.5 = 0;
the university origin dummy
is coded as 0 for university
only credit unions, 1for the
diversified from a university
credit union and –1 for the
diversified to a university
credit union ensuring that
the subcategory codes sum
to zero, i.e., 0 + 1 – 1 = 0.
This coding also ensures
that the two dummy
variables are orthogonal:
since summing the product
of codes across the two
dummies sums to zero, i.e.,
1*0 – 0.5*1 – 0.5*(–1) = 0.
17. EMS software was
developed by Holger Scheel
at University of Dortmund,
Germany.
18. The difference is
ignificant at the 1% level (p
< 0.01).
References
Alchian, A. A. & Demsetz, H.
(1972). Production,
information costs, and
economic organization. 
American Economic
Review, 62, 777-795.
Bauer, K. J., Miles, L. L., &
Nishikawa, T. (2009).
The effect of mergers on
credit union perfor-
mance. Journal of
Banking & Finance, 33,
2267-2274. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W.,
& Rhodes, E. (1978).
Measuring the efficiency
of decision making
units. European Journal
of Operations Research,
2, 429-444. 
Frame, W. S., Karels, G. V.,
& McClatchey, C. A.
(2003). Do credit unions
use their tax advantage
to benefit members?
Evidence from a cost
function. Review of
Financial Economics, 12,
35-47.
Frame, W. S., Karels, G. V.,
& McClatchey, C. (2002).
The effect of the
common bond and
membership expansion
on credit union risk.
Financial Review, 37,
613-636. 
Fried, H. O., Lovell, C. K., &
Eeckaut, P. V. (1993).
Evaluating the
performance of US credit
unions. Journal of
Banking and Finance,
17, 251-265. 
Fried, H., Lovell, C., &
Turner, J. (1996). An
analysis of the
performance of
university-affiliated
credit unions.
Computers and
Operations Research, 23,
375-384. 
Fried, H. O., Lovell, C. K., &
Yaisawarng, S. (1999). 
The impact of mergers
on credit union service
provision. Journal of
Banking & Finance, 23,
367-386. 
Fukuyama, H., Guerra, R.,
& Weber, W. L. (1999).
Efficiency and
ownership: evidence
from Japanese credit
cooperatives. Journal of
Economics and Business,
51, 473-487.
Garden, K. A. & Ralston, D.
E. (1999). The
x-efficiency and
allocative efficiency
effects of credit union
mergers. Journal of
International Financial
Markets, Institutions and
Money, 9, 285-301. 
Glass, J. C. & McKillop, D.
G. (2006). The impact of
differing operating
environments on U.S.
credit union performance.
Applied Financial
Economics, 16,
1285-1300. 
Goddard, J. A., McKillop, D.
G., & Wilson, J. O.
(2002). The growth of US
credit unions. Journal of
Banking and Finance,
26, 2327–2356. 
Southern Business Review Winter 2012 17
Goddard, J., McKillop, D., &
Wilson, J. O. (2009).
Which credit unions are
acquired? Journal of
Financial Services
Research, 36, 231-252. 
Jossa, B. (2009). Alchian
and Demsetz’s critique
of the cooperative firm
thirty-seven years after.
Metroeconomica, 60:4,
686-714. 
Leggett, K. J. & Strand, R.
W. (2002). Membership
growth, multiple
membership groups and
agency control at credit
unions. Review of
Financial Economics, 11,
37-46. 
Mohanty, S. K. (2006).
Comparing credit unions
with commercial banks:
implications for public
policy. Journal of
Commercial Banking and
Finance, 5, 97-113. 
Copyright of Southern Business Review is the property of Georgia Southern University, College of Business
Administration and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
